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Oversight of Presidential Funds by the Appropriations Committees

Learning from the Watergate Crisis

University of Missouri-Columbia

This article examines congressional oversight of presidential funds during the Watergate crisis. During the crisis it became clear members of the Appropriations Committees of Congress were reluctant to look into the use of presidential funds. When they did, it was apparent that these funds were virtually uncontrolled. Three problems are examined here: the use of the Special Projects fund, the lack of distinction between it and the Emergency Fundfor the President, and the absence of authorization for the White House Office, Salaries, and Expensesfund. The relevance of theories of legislative oversight to presidentialfunding are evaluated. Though some lessons were learned about oversight of executivefunds as a result of the Watergate experience, other more basic lessons have been ignored.

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