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On the Organizational Theory of Evaluation

Economic and Political Constraints and the Choice of an Evaluation Agent

Auburn University

David L. Martin

Auburn University

This article uses Wamsley and Zald's discussion of the political economy of public organizations to develop categories of constraints on evaluation in bureaucratic settings. It argues that the relevant literature focuses largely on political factors, in part because this literature concentrates on the utilization of evaluation results. Interviews with federal administrators concerning the establishment of an evaluation unit are used to explore a mix of economic and political factors. The article concludes that program managers choosing an evaluation agent have some latitude to determine the timing and context of different struggles over evaluation.

Administration & Society, Vol. 18, No. 3, 315-333 (1986)
DOI: 10.1177/009539978601800302


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