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Administration & Society, Vol. 19, No. 1, 95-124 (1987)
DOI: 10.1177/009539978701900105

State Implementation and Federal Enforcement Priorities

Safety versus Health in OSHA and the States

Frank J. Thompson

University of Georgia, Athens

Michael J. Scicchitano

University of Connecticut, Storrs

Observers allege that federal regulatory programs often establish inappropriate enforcement priorities. Efforts to comprehend the establishment of priorities and attempts to change them need to acknowledge that the states of ten play pivotal roles in enforcing federal regulatory policies. This article draws on the experience gained under the Occupational Safety and Health Act to explore, first, the degree to which state programs have exacerbated tendencies to emphasize safety over health enforcement in the workplace and inhibited amelioration of this situation. The findings do not consistently support a pessimistic perspective concerning state performance. Second, the article tests the utility of six possible explanations of variation in enforcement priorities among state implementing agents. Business dominance, pro-regulatory, and convergence explanations appear more helpful than affluence, partisan, and problem-severity theories.


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[Abstract]