This Article Full Text (PDF) References Alert me when this article is cited Alert me if a correction is posted Services Email this article to a friend Similar articles in this journal Alert me to new issues of the journal Add to Saved Citations Download to citation manager Request Permissions Request Reprints Add to My Marked Citations Citing Articles Citing Articles via HighWire Citing Articles via Google Scholar Google Scholar Articles by Worsham, J. Articles by Ringquist, E. J. Search for Related Content Social Bookmarking                   What's this?

Assessing the Assumptions

A Critical Analysis of Agency Theory

West Virginia University

Marc Allen Eisner

Wesleyan University

Evan J. Ringquist

Florida State University

Principal-agent (agency) theory dominates the bureaucratic politics literature. Yet there has been very little effort devoted to assessing the assumptions of agency theory since the model was imported from economics. This article examines five major assumptions underlying agency theory. The authors suggest that the effort to translate and apply assumptions from economics to the study of bureaucratic politics misses much that is important. They offer modifications to agency theory and a new direction for research.

CiteULike    Connotea    Del.icio.us    Digg    Reddit    Technorati    What's this?

This article has been cited by other articles:

				R. F. Durant and W. F. West Merit Protection, Federal Agencies, and the New Personnel Management: Explaining Cross-Agency Variation in MSPB Appeals Decisions, FY 1988 to FY 1997 Administration Society, January 1, 2001; 32(6): 627 - 667. [Abstract] [PDF]