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Risk Regulation Under Pressure

Problem Solving or Blame Shifting?

London School of Economics

Henry Rothstein

London School of Economics

This article explores a style-phase model of staged organizational responses to external pressure for change against two competing hypotheses, focusing on demands for greater openness and transparency. A study of six risk regulation regimes in the United Kingdom revealed that only half were exposed to substantial pressures of this type. Responses of organizations in the "high-pressure" regimes were varied, but the overall pattern was consistent with a mixture of an autopoietic and staged-response hypothesis stressing blame prevention, and the article accordingly presents a hybrid "Catherine Wheel" model of the observed pattern. The article concludes by discussing the implications for policy outcomes.

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