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The Morality of Value- and Purpose-Rationality

The Kantian Roots of Weber's Foundational Distinction

Leiden University

Petra Schreurs

Publiek Domein, Utrecht

Max Weber's distinction between purpose- and value-rationality is almost universally accepted in administrative theory. Its precise meaning is, however, unclear. In this article, more insight into the nature of Weber's distinction is claimed by approaching it from a (neo-) Kantian perspective. It is claimed that the Kantian contrast between autonomy and heteronomy of the will and the distinction between absolute and relative ends is at the heart of Weber's distinction. This implies that the distinction has paradoxical underpinnings as it is rooted in a moral context that does not fit Weber's sociological approach.

Key Words: rationality • values • social action • Max Weber • Immanuel Kant

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